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         NOT PRECEDENTIAL 
 
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS 
FOR THE THIRD CIRCUIT                        
_____________ 
 
No. 18-1963 
_____________ 
 
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA 
 
 v. 
 
 SAMUEL MANGEL, 
                        Appellant  
_____________ 
        
 
On Appeal from the United States District Court 
for the Eastern District of Pennsylvania 
District Court No. 2-16-cr-00147-001 
District Judge: The Honorable Paul S. Diamond 
                               
Submitted Pursuant to Third Circuit L.A.R. 34.1(a) 
March 4, 2019 
 
Before: SMITH, Chief Judge, AMBRO, and RESTREPO, Circuit Judges 
 
(Filed: May 21, 2019)                              
_____________________ 
 
  OPINION* 
_____________________        
                       
SMITH, Chief Judge.  
  
                                                          
* This disposition is not an opinion of the full court and pursuant to I.O.P. 5.7 does 
not constitute binding precedent. 
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Pursuant to a written plea agreement, Samuel Mangel pleaded guilty to four 
counts of wire fraud, in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 1343, and one count of engaging 
in the business of insurance after being convicted of a felony involving dishonesty, 
in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 1033(e)(1).  The plea agreement contained a broad 
appellate waiver of Mangel’s right to file a direct appeal or to seek collateral relief. 
The waiver permitted an appeal only under limited circumstances.1  The United 
States District Court for the Eastern District of Pennsylvania sentenced Mangel to 
an above-guidelines sentence of 60 months’ imprisonment on each count, to be 
served concurrently, followed by three years of supervised release.  This timely 
appeal followed.2  
During the plea colloquy, the District Court reviewed at length the terms of 
the plea agreement with Mangel, paying particular attention to the appellate 
                                                          
1 Mangel could appeal or petition for collateral relief if:  the Government appealed; 
he challenged the District Court’s decision to impose either a sentence exceeding 
the statutory maximum, an “upward departure” pursuant to the Sentencing 
Guidelines, or an “upward variance” above the final Sentencing Guidelines range; 
or he asserted an ineffective assistance of counsel claim.   
2 The District Court had subject matter jurisdiction pursuant to 18 U.S.C. § 3231.  
We have appellate jurisdiction over the matter under 28 U.S.C. § 1291 and 18 
U.S.C. § 3742(a).  Even a valid appellate waiver “does not deprive this Court of 
jurisdiction over the defendant’s claims, and we retain subject matter jurisdiction 
over the defendant’s appeal despite the waiver.”  United States v. Jackson, 523 
F.3d 234, 242 (3d Cir. 2008) (citing United States v. Gwinnett, 483 F.3d 200, 203 
(3d Cir. 2007)).  Our review of whether an appellate waiver is valid and 
enforceable is plenary.  United States v. Khattak, 273 F.3d 557, 560 (3d Cir. 2001). 
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waiver.3  Mangel then decided to sign the plea agreement, including the appellate 
waiver, and entered his guilty plea.  Additionally, he executed an 
Acknowledgement of Rights outlining the rights he possessed and would be giving 
up by pleading guilty and as a result of his appellate waiver.4  
Mangel now contends: (1) his appeal is not barred by the appellate waiver in 
his plea agreement, or alternatively that the waiver should not be enforced; (2) the 
District Court erred when it included relevant conduct in calculating the Guidelines 
range; (3) the District Court erred when it imposed an upward variance from the 
final Guidelines range it calculated; and (4) prior defense counsel provided 
ineffective assistance of counsel.  The Government argues we should enforce 
Mangel’s appellate waiver and bar his challenge to the District Court’s calculation 
of the Sentencing Guidelines.  The Government also asserts that the sentence was 
substantively reasonable.  Finally, it argues Mangel’s claim of ineffective 
assistance of counsel should be reserved for collateral review. We agree with the 
Government.  
                                                          
3 See App. 197 (The District Court: “Do you understand as set out in your guilty 
plea agreement that you are expressly and voluntarily waiving, meaning giving up 
forever, all your rights to appeal or collaterally attack your sentence, conviction or 
any other matter relating to this prosecution . . . [and do you] understand the only 
appeal you might have from your guilty plea[,] if I accept it, would be if I impose a 
sentence that exceeds the statutory maximum for any count or conviction . . . or if I 
depart or vary upward . . . [?]”  Mangel replied: “Yes, Your Honor.”). 
4 See App. 23-24; see also App. 202.  
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We review the enforceability of an appellate waiver by inquiring as follows: 
(1) whether the waiver of the right to appeal was knowing and voluntary; (2) 
whether one of the specific exceptions set forth in the waiver allows appellate 
review of the issue presented by the defendant; and (3) “whether enforcing the 
waiver would work a miscarriage of justice.”  United States v. Goodson, 544 F.3d 
529, 536 (3d Cir. 2008) (citing United States v. Jackson, 523 F.3d 234, 243–44 (3d 
Cir. 2008)).  We conclude that the appellate waiver here was both knowing and 
voluntary.  Consistent with Federal Rule of Criminal Procedure 11(b)(1)(N), the 
District Court reviewed the terms of the appellate waiver with Mangel at length.  
He affirmed he understood the terms of the waiver before the court accepted his 
plea.  We also disagree with his contention that the knowing and voluntary nature 
of the waiver “retroactively vanishe[d]” if the Government breached the plea 
agreement.  Appellant Reply Br. 2.  A breach does not retroactively render a guilty 
plea unknowing or involuntary.  Indeed, “[i]t is precisely because the plea was 
knowing and voluntary (and hence valid) that the Government is obligated to 
uphold its side of the bargain.”  Puckett v. United States, 556 U.S. 129, 137–38 
(2009).  
In an attempt to avoid the enforcement of his appellate waiver, Mangel 
contends that the Government breached the plea agreement by objecting to the 
acceptance-of-responsibility adjustment under U.S.S.G. § 3E1.1 and by advocating 
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for a sentence at the top of the Guidelines range.  We are not persuaded.  The plea 
agreement memorialized that the parties “agree[d] and stipulate[d] that, as of the 
date of this agreement, the defendant has demonstrated acceptance of responsibility 
for his offense.”  App. 19.  Thereafter, Mangel decided to put the Government to 
its proof at sentencing with regard to the amount of loss.  It understandably 
objected to the downward adjustment for acceptance of responsibility under 
§ 3E1.1.  Because there was a temporal component to the stipulation for the 
adjustment, we conclude that the Government’s protest of the acceptance-of-
responsibility adjustment under the circumstances did not constitute a breach. 
Nor was there a breach of the plea agreement as a result of the 
Government’s request for a sentence at the top of the Guidelines.  The plea 
agreement expressly provided that the Government could “make whatever 
sentencing recommendation . . . [it] deem[ed] appropriate.”  App. 17.5 
Because the waiver was knowing and voluntary, it bars challenges Mangel 
might otherwise raise on direct appeal or collateral review.  As no express 
                                                          
5 Mangel also contends that the Government breached the plea agreement by 
enticing him to sign that agreement based on the indictment, but then changed its 
proffer at the plea hearing by including as relevant conduct that he defrauded other 
victims and increased the amount of loss assessment under U.S.S.G. 
§ 2B1.1(b)(1)(H).  According to Mangel, this constituted bad faith.  Because the 
record demonstrates that Mangel knowingly and voluntarily pleaded guilty, we 
reject his contention that the Government acted in bad faith by enticing him to 
plead guilty.   
6 
 
exception to the appellate waiver allows Mangel to challenge the District Court’s 
Guidelines calculation, that challenge is barred.  Because the waiver language does 
allow Mangel to appeal or seek collateral relief based on an upward variance or the 
ineffective assistance of counsel, his respective claims on these issues are 
permissible.  
Finally, enforcing the waiver would not work a “miscarriage of justice.”  See 
United States v. Wilson, 429 F.3d 455, 458 (3d Cir. 2005).  Although we have not 
precisely defined a “miscarriage of justice,” we consider “the clarity of the error, 
its gravity, its character (e.g., whether it concerns a fact issue, a sentencing 
guideline, or a statutory maximum), the impact of the error on the defendant, the 
impact of correcting the error on the government, and the extent to which the 
defendant acquiesced in the result.” Jackson, 523 F.3d at 242–43 (quoting United 
States v. Khattak, 273 F.3d 557, 563 (3d Cir. 2001)) (internal quotation marks 
omitted).  As none of these factors weigh in Mangel’s favor, we will enforce his 
appellate waiver and dismiss his challenge to the Guidelines calculation.  
Mangel contends that his sentence is substantively unreasonable because the 
District Court failed to “comport with the application specifications of 18 U.S.C. 
§ 3553(b)” at sentencing when it considered the facts, length, and size of the 
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offense as a justification for a significant upward variance.6  Appellant’s Br. 29.  
We disagree.  As the Government notes, this argument erroneously relies on 
statutory subsection (b) of § 3553 that the Supreme Court concluded in United 
States v. Booker “must be severed and excised” to render the Guidelines advisory.  
543 U.S. 220, 245 (2005).  
We have “upheld [a sentence] as reasonable if the record as a whole reflects 
rational and meaningful consideration of the factors enumerated in 18 U.S.C. 
§ 3553(a).”  United States v. Schweitzer, 454 F.3d 197, 204 (3d Cir. 2006) (internal 
quotation marks omitted).  A review of the record in this case convinces us that the 
sentence was reasonable.  Although the 60-month term of imprisonment on each 
count exceeds the Sentencing Guidelines range of 37 to 46 months, it does not 
exceed the statutory maximum for the offenses of conviction.  In fashioning the 
sentence, the District Court properly considered “the nature and circumstances of 
the offense and the history and characteristics of the defendant,” pursuant to 18 
U.S.C. § 3553(a)(1).7  The District Court also cited Mangel’s prior conviction for 
                                                          
6 We review the substantive reasonableness of a sentence for abuse of discretion.  
United States v. Tomko, 562 F.3d 558, 567 (3d Cir 2009) (en banc).  “[W]e apply a 
deferential standard” to the District Court’s judgment, United States v. Cooper, 
437 F.3d 324, 330 (3d Cir. 2006), abrogated on other grounds by United States v. 
Rita, 551 U.S. 338 (2007), and “focus on . . . the totality of the circumstances,” 
with no “presum[ption] that a sentence is [substantively] unreasonable simply 
because it falls outside the advisory Guidelines range.”  Tomko, 562 F.3d at 567.   
7 See App. 119–120 (The District Court noted: “[Mangel] is incapable of being 
honest, and if he remains at liberty, will seek to steal whatever isn’t nailed down.  
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making false statements to a financial institution in determining a sentence that 
would reflect the “seriousness of the offense[,] to promote respect for the law, to 
provide just punishment, to provide deterrence to criminal conduct, and to protect 
the public from further crimes” Mangel might commit.  App. 119.  Thus, the 
District Court did not abuse its discretion when it considered the factors outlined in 
§ 3553(a).   
Mangel also asserts a claim of ineffective assistance of counsel.  The 
Government contends this challenge should be reserved for collateral review, and 
we agree.  Although the express terms of the appellate waiver suggest Mangel may 
raise this challenge now, his ineffective-assistance-of-counsel claim is not 
sufficiently developed to allow appropriate review on direct appeal.  See United 
States v. Thornton, 327 F.3d 268, 271–72 (3d Cir. 2003) (concluding it is 
“preferable that such claims be considered on collateral review rather than on 
direct appeal”); see also Massaro v. United States, 538 U.S. 500, 504–05 (2003)  
                                                          
He stole from the six policyholders . . . [and] he defrauded the person who . . . 
thought he was investing in [Mangel]’s business, when in fact, he was bankrolling 
[Mangel]’s life.  [Mangel] took advantage of people who needed money 
desperately enough that they were willing to sell their life insurance policies.  And 
he stole significant amounts of money from them.  These outrageous acts . . . 
require . . . a substantial term of incarceration to deter both [Mangel] and others. 
And I don’t believe a guideline sentence would be reasonable in these 
circumstances.”).  
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For the foregoing reasons, we will enforce Mangel’s appellate waiver and 
affirm the judgment of the District Court.8 
 
                                                          
8 We have carefully considered the arguments in Mangel’s briefs and, to the extent 
any arguments are not explicitly addressed herein, have concluded they lack merit.  
